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NOTE

SEARCHING FOR TRUTH IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S
TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE
Renee Griffin*
Threats of violence, even when not actually carried out, can inflict real damage. As such, state and federal laws criminalize threats in a wide range of circumstances. But threats are also speech, and free speech is broadly protected
by the First Amendment. The criminalization of threats is nonetheless possible
because of Supreme Court precedents denying First Amendment protection to
“true threats.” Yet a crucial question remains unanswered: What counts as a
true threat?
This Note examines courts’ attempts to answer this question and identifies the
many ambiguities that have resulted from those attempts. In particular, this
piece highlights three frontiers of judicial confusion that are likely to arise in a
true threat case: (1) what type of intent the First Amendment requires, (2) the
proper standard of review on appeals of true threat convictions, and (3) the
contextual analyses in which courts engage to assess whether a threat is “true”
(and, by extension, whether a threat conviction was constitutional). This third
frontier is discussed most extensively, as it has the greatest impact on a case’s
ultimate outcome. This Note also proposes a new framework for inquiries into
the context of true threats, adapted from defamation law, in order to increase
consistency and ensure adequate protection of speech rights within the chaotic
true threat doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
A threat is a grotesquely powerful weapon. Apart from any physical violence that may follow, the threat itself induces fear and can inflict genuine
harm on its target. A terrorist group’s bomb threat can destabilize a community and set citizens on edge, regardless of whether an explosive detonates; 1 a
domestic abuser’s threat to harm his wife traumatizes her, regardless of
whether he strikes her in the moment; 2 an online troll’s death threat to a reporter can prevent her from doing her job and wreak havoc on her mental
health, regardless of whether the violence ever materializes. 3
The rapid expansion of communication technology means that threats,
and all their attendant harms, can now be inflicted with a tap on a screen. Inperson threats still occur, of course, but alternative methods—ranging from a

1. See generally Alex Schmid, Terrorism as Psychological Warfare, 1 DEMOCRACY & SEC.
137 (2005).
2. See TK Logan, “If I Can’t Have You Nobody Will”: Explicit Threats in the Context of
Coercive Control, 32 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 126, 132–34 (2017); Jessica Miles, Straight Outta
SCOTUS: Domestic Violence, True Threats, and Free Speech, 74 U. MIA. L. REV. 711, 733–40 (2020).
3. See Philip Eil, The Worst Effects of Online Death Threats Are Things No One Can See,
VICE (July 22, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/qv7yyq/the-worst-effects-of-onlinedeath-threats-are-things-no-one-can-see [perma.cc/3EKX-FRH4]; Jason Wilson, Doxxing, Assault, Death Threats: The New Dangers Facing US Journalists Covering Extremism, GUARDIAN
(June 14, 2018, 10:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/14/doxxing-assault-deaththreats-the-new-dangers-facing-us-journalists-covering-extremism [perma.cc/9GG8-6N7D].
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threatening phone call to an especially vicious tweet—are innumerable, costless, and potentially anonymous. 4 With this in mind, the impulse to punish
individuals who threaten others is understandable, perhaps even imperative.
In the United States, the rational desire to sanction threatening language
runs up against a formidable barrier: the First Amendment. The amendment
protects a vast range of speech from government restriction, including speech
that some may find upsetting, inaccurate, or offensive. 5 It is not difficult to
imagine how laws restricting threats could infringe upon this “prized American privilege to speak one’s mind.” 6 Speech that one person perceives as a
threat might reasonably be interpreted by others as a mere expression of feeling or as a controversial idea. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized
that certain types of speech remain “constitutionally proscribable.” 7 “True
threats” are one such category, 8 paving the way for federal and state statutes
that criminalize threatening speech. 9 Making true threats an exception to First
Amendment protection nonetheless raises the question: How do we know a
true threat when we see it?
So far, the Court has failed to provide a practicable answer, leaving lower
courts in the lurch. Labeling a threat as “true” is meaningless at best and misleading at worst. “True” implies some degree of actualization—that the statement must reflect a real intention to go through with the threatened act. 10 But
the Supreme Court has clarified that the defendant in a true threat case does
not need to have an intent to act in order to be convicted. 11 Instead, the government need only prove a specific “intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”12 Lower courts disagree about what exactly that intent
looks like, though. 13 Beyond this threshold question about intent, courts have
also struggled to reach consensus on downstream issues such as the standard
of review for assessing the constitutionality of a threat conviction and the test

4. See Micah Lee, How to Run a Rogue Government Twitter Account with an Anonymous
Email Address and a Burner Phone, INTERCEPT (Feb. 20, 2017, 9:53 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/02/20/how-to-run-a-rogue-government-twitter-account-with-an-anonymousemail-address-and-a-burner-phone [perma.cc/WV4T-PJUS].
5. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964). “Speech” and “statements” are used loosely throughout this Note to describe many different types of expression, including written material and even expressive conduct.
6. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
7. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
8. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
9. See infra note 33.
10. See True, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/true
[perma.cc/K874-JCPC].
11. Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60.
12. Id. at 360.
13. See infra Section II.A.
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that should be used to evaluate the relevant context in true threat cases. 14 This
contextual analysis is particularly difficult for courts as the inquiry is highly
fact intensive, and no single approach to this crucial analytical step has
emerged. Despite the uncertainty pervading every phase of a true threat case,
American courts regularly convict defendants for “threatening” speech. 15
The recent case of Commonwealth v. Knox demonstrates the hazards of
current true threat doctrine. 16 There, teenage defendant Jamal Knox wrote
and recorded a rap song entitled “F--k the Police,” with violent lyrics directed
at the police in general and at two Pittsburgh police officers in particular. 17
After the Pittsburgh police came across the song on Facebook, Knox was
charged with witness intimidation and making “terroristic threats” under
Pennsylvania state law. 18 Knox was convicted and sentenced to multiple years
in prison. 19 He appealed all the way to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, arguing that his speech was protected under the First Amendment. 20 The court
affirmed his conviction, finding the evidence competent to show his subjective
intent to threaten the officers based on the court’s interpretation of the lyrics
themselves and four “contextual factors.”21 But breaking down the opinion
reveals that the court’s analysis of context was surface level at best. 22 Still, the
U.S. Supreme Court denied Knox’s petition for writ of certiorari. 23
This Note argues that courts’ haphazard approach to analyzing context in
true threat cases risks the unconstitutional criminalization of protected speech.
Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s sparse case law creating and defining the
true threat doctrine. Using Knox as a representative example, Part II examines
three areas of disagreement that have emerged between courts struggling to
apply the Court’s inscrutable true threat holdings. Specifically, this Part emphasizes the importance of contextual factors in determining whether particular speech counts as a “true threat” and concludes that courts’ ad hoc
approach to this contextual analysis does not work. To help courts more consistently and thoroughly identify true threats in a manner that aligns with First
Amendment principles, Part III proposes a four-part framework borrowed
from defamation law to analyze the complex context surrounding a threat.

14. See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 937 F.3d 1042 (7th Cir. 2019); Commonwealth v.
Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589 (3d Cir. 2016); Looney v.
State, 785 S.E.2d 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
16. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1146.
17. Id. at 1149.
18. Id. at 1150.
19. 2 Sentenced in Threatening Rap Video Case, CBS PITTSBURGH (Feb. 6, 2014, 1:06 PM),
https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2014/02/06/2-sentenced-in-threatening-rap-video-case [perma.cc
/R5YZ-TQ9Q].
20. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1148.
21. Id. at 1153, 1159–61.
22. See infra Section II.D.3.
23. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
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SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE

The protections enshrined in the First Amendment are broad, prohibiting
Congress and state legislatures from making any law “abridging the freedom
of speech.” 24 The Supreme Court has read the Amendment to express “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” even where such debate includes “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” 25 In practice, this constitutional mandate
prevents state actors from punishing or restricting the expression of an idea
“simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 26
But the First Amendment’s reach is not unlimited. 27 The Supreme Court
has held that certain categories of speech should not receive the typical protection, generally because these categories have “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth” that any
possible benefits of the speech are “clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.” 28 These narrow exceptions to the general rule of First
Amendment protection include obscenity, defamation, fighting words, and—
most relevant here—true threats. 29
Threats are, at the most basic level, “pure speech.” 30 They are statements
made strictly for the purpose of conveying a particular idea, like “I am going
to hurt you.” 31 Traditionally, pure speech receives the highest degree of First
Amendment protection. 32 Yet states and the federal government have enacted
myriad laws criminalizing threats in one form or another, 33 prosecuting
speakers based solely on their words as well as the meaning that those words
conveyed. This is possible because the Supreme Court has carved out “true
threats” as categorically unprotected by the Constitution due to their lack of
value and countervailing high costs to society. 34 As a result, a defendant’s liberty may hinge on which threats count as “true”—a naturally complicated
question. This thorniness is exacerbated by the fact that the Court has only

24. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).
25. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
26. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
27. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (“From 1791 to the present,
however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the
content of speech in a few limited areas . . . .”).
28. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
29. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.
30. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
31. See Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining pure speech as
“[w]ords or conduct limited in form to what is necessary to convey the idea”).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875; 18 PA. STAT AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2706 (2015); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 71 (West 2014); MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
34. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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ever heard three true threat cases: Watts v. United States, 35 Virginia v. Black, 36
and Elonis v. United States. 37 To lay out what the Court has (and, more importantly, has not) established about true threats, this Part explains the relevant holdings of each case in turn.
A. Watts v. United States
When the Supreme Court confronted a criminal threat conviction for the
first time in 1969, it created as much ambiguity as it resolved. The case, Watts
v. United States, involved a federal statute that prohibited “knowingly and
willfully” making “any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon
the President of the United States.” 38 Defendant Robert Watts, who had just
been drafted into the military during the Vietnam War, was charged with stating that “[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my
sights is L. B. J.,” referring to then-President Lyndon B. Johnson. 39 Watts argued that his conviction violated his First Amendment rights.
The Court accepted the government’s stated interest in protecting the
president as compelling. 40 It also agreed that, in the most literal sense, Watts
had clearly made a threat against President Johnson. 41 But the Court then proceeded to scrutinize the conviction with the “commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.” 42 As a result, the Court overturned Watts’s conviction,
finding that his speech was “the kind of political hyperbole” that could not
constitute a punishable true threat. 43
Yet the Court hardly explained why Watts’s speech qualified as mere political hyperbole. Its reasoning spanned a few short sentences and highlighted
just three key facts of the case: the location of Watts’s statement in the “political arena,” the “expressly conditional” nature of his statement, and the fact
that listeners laughed in reaction to his statement. 44 Courts and scholars have
since interpreted Watts as an instruction to consider broader contextual circumstances, and those three factors in particular, when evaluating whether a
statement rises to the level of a criminally punishable true threat. 45 Still, the

35. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
36. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
37. 575 U.S. 723 (2015).
38. Watts, 394 U.S. at 705.
39. Id. at 706.
40. Id. at 707.
41. See id. at 706.
42. Id. at 707.
43. Id. at 708.
44. Id.
45. See Jing Xun Quek, Elonis v. United States: The Next Twelve Years, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1109, 1113 (2016). Section II.C explores the development of these factors by lower
courts in more detail.
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holding is difficult to generalize, and lower courts unsurprisingly have struggled to apply the doctrine in the years since Watts. 46
B. Virginia v. Black
When the Supreme Court returned to the issue of true threats in 2003, its
decision again failed to resolve much of the doctrine’s uncertainty. The Court
in Virginia v. Black considered the constitutionality of a law that banned cross
burning done with “an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” 47
The law also stated that any cross burning served as “prima facie evidence” of
the requisite intent to intimidate. 48 Accordingly, the trial court instructed the
jury that “the burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you
may infer the required intent.” 49 The Court ultimately held that this jury instruction violated the First Amendment on its face. 50 The problem, according
to the Court, was that a fact-specific inquiry into intent was the only way to
distinguish an unprotected true threat from “lawful political speech at the core
of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.”51 The jury instruction
relieved the jury of its constitutional duty to perform this inquiry, rendering
the defendants’ convictions invalid. 52 A key holding of Black, then, was that a
contextual, fact-intensive analysis of a defendant’s intent is required to identify and punish a true threat within the bounds of the Constitution.
While this holding may seem like a step toward clarity, the Black Court
did not explicitly name the contextual factors that might be determinative in
finding an intent to intimidate. Instead, the Court listed hypothetical contexts
in which cross burnings might occur, implying that some may count as constitutionally proscribable true threats while others may not. 53 Read broadly,
the list suggests that relevant factors include the defendant’s stated purpose,
the size of the defendant’s audience, and the location where the speech occurred. 54 Despite emphasizing the importance of contextual factors in true
threat cases, the Court in Black said very little as to what those factors might
look like or how they should be weighed.
Black was also significant because it marked the first time the Court affirmatively defined the phrase “true threat.” According to the Court, a true
threat is a “statement[] where the speaker means to communicate a serious
46. See Adrienne Scheffey, Note, Defining Intent in 165 Characters or Less: A Call for Clarity
in the Intent Standard of True Threats After Virginia v. Black, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 861, 872 (2015).
47. 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003).
48. Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
49. Id. at 349.
50. Id. at 367 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 365.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 366–67. The Court concluded that failing to distinguish between the intent reflected by those differing contexts would constitute a “shortcut” not permitted by the First
Amendment. Id.
54. See id.
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expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.”55 The Court further explained that true
threats are not protected by the First Amendment mainly because the fear of
violence they foster is itself a harm, one the state can seek to prevent. 56 This
description made clear that a threat is not “true” based on whether or not the
speaker “actually intend[ed] to carry out the threat.”57 Instead, what matters
is whether the speaker “mean[t] to communicate” a serious threat of violence. 58 In this sense, “true” is a misleading label for the sort of threat that the
First Amendment does not protect. More accurately (albeit less academically),
a threat is punishable only when it is very scary and was intended to be so. 59
C. Elonis v. United States
The Supreme Court managed to shed even less light on the doctrine in its
most recent case involving an alleged true threat, Elonis v. United States. 60
There, defendant Anthony Elonis was charged under the federal threat statute
for posting rap lyrics to Facebook that included apparent threats of violence
toward his ex-wife. 61 The main issue was that the statute did not explicitly include an intent requirement. 62 The Court cited criminal law and statutoryinterpretation principles, not free-speech doctrine, in its holding that a defendant could only be convicted under the federal threat statute if the government proved that the defendant communicated with the purpose or
knowledge that the statement would be viewed as a threat. 63 But the majority
did not rely on the First Amendment at all, cabining its holding to the single
statute at issue. 64 Consequently, Black and Watts remain the only binding Supreme Court cases regarding true threats from a First Amendment perspective.
Elonis does, however, provide some insight into how the justices on the
Court in 2015 were thinking about true threats. Justice Alito authored a separate opinion that reached the broader First Amendment implications of the

55. Id. at 359 (majority opinion).
56. Id. at 360 (“[A] prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to protecting people ‘from
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992))).
57. Id.; see also Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1261 (2006); Scheffey, supra note 46, at 873–74.
58. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
59. You may suspect that scariness is not an easy thing for a court to ascertain. This intuition would be correct. See infra Part II.
60. 575 U.S. 723 (2015), rev’g 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013).
61. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 726–31.
62. Id. at 732.
63. Id. at 734–35, 737–40.
64. Id. at 740; see also Marley N. Brison, Note, Elonis v. United States: The Need for a
Recklessness Standard in True Threats Jurisprudence, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 493, 505 (2017).
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case. 65 He would have held that free-speech principles required a prosecutor
to show that the defendant was at least reckless in making a statement that
could reasonably be perceived as a threat. 66 He also rejected Elonis’s argument
that any intent requirement short of a subjective “intent to harm” would unconstitutionally punish protected speech. 67 Justice Alito pointed to other areas
of First Amendment law, such as defamation, in which the Court had approved a recklessness standard as sufficiently protective of speech while still
allowing governments to punish unprotected statements. 68
Lastly, Justice Alito shot down Elonis’s argument that his rap lyrics were
not a threat but rather a “work[] of art” entitled to full First Amendment protection. In his reasoning, Justice Alito cited Watts and its emphasis on context. 69 He noted that certain facts in the record reflected Elonis’s intent to
threaten rather than an intent to create “art.” 70 These facts included Elonis’s
history of abusing his wife and his apparent efforts to make sure that his wife
saw his posts. 71 According to Justice Alito, threatening statements in song lyrics, on social media, and elsewhere must be “[t]aken in context” to avoid
“grant[ing] a license to anyone who is clever enough to dress up a real threat
in the guise of rap lyrics, a parody, or something similar.” 72 Justice Alito’s assertion that “context matters” is indisputable, but it does not explain how
courts can use context to unmask disguised threats in practice.
II.

FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL CONFUSION IN THE TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE

Supreme Court precedent ultimately clarifies very little about how to apply the true threat doctrine. As a result, lower-court opinions in true threat
cases are, collectively, a mess. This Part sorts the array of unresolved doctrinal
questions into three distinct issues and explores how lower courts have attempted to handle them.
The first issue, discussed in Section II.A, involves the intent requirement
for true threats. Specifically, this Section collects case law addressing whether
the First Amendment requires the government to show that the defendant subjectively intended to threaten or if the speech must be objectively threatening.
After a court takes a side in the formalistic intent debate, there remains
the harder task of applying the facts to the law. Section II.B explains the standard of review by which appellate courts should analyze a true threat conviction

65. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 742 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 746–48.
67. Id. at 746–47.
68. Id. at 748 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)).
69. Id. at 747.
70. Id. at 748.
71. See id. at 747–48.
72. Id. at 747.

730

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:721

to evaluate whether it offends the First Amendment. Section II.C then examines the contextual factors appellate courts deploy when interpreting a true
threat defendant’s intent. Finally, Section II.D focuses on one recent case,
Commonwealth v. Knox, 73 to demonstrate how the judicial confusion in true
threat jurisprudence risks inadequate protection of First Amendment rights.
A. Intent Requirement
Most judicial and scholarly debate regarding the true threat doctrine surrounds the legal question of requisite intent. 74 After Black, a circuit split developed over whether the First Amendment required the government to prove
that the defendant had an objective intent to threaten (based on a “reasonable
person’s” perception of the speech) or a subjective intent to threaten (based on
the defendant’s own state of mind). 75 The majority of federal appellate courts
initially adopted some version of the objective test. 76 But the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits instead applied a test that focused on the speaker’s subjective intent
to threaten a person or group with his or her statement. 77
By mandating a subjective-intent standard in only a narrow set of true
threat cases brought under the federal threat statute, Elonis failed to resolve

73. 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018).
74. Crane, supra note 57, at 1261.
75. Id. at 1261–65; Scheffey, supra note 46.
76. United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]his court has applied an
objective defendant vantage point standard post-Black.”); United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298,
305 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The test is . . . whether an ordinary, reasonable recipient . . . familiar with
the context . . . would interpret it as a threat . . . .” (quoting United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49
(2d Cir. 1994))); United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 331 n.7 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur test asks
whether a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be understood as a threat.”),
rev’d, 575 U.S. 723 (2015); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 507 (4th Cir. 2012) (describing
test as whether “an ordinary reasonable recipient . . . familiar with the context . . . would interpret [the statement] as a threat” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d
182, 185 (4th Cir. 2009))); Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Speech is a ‘true threat’ and therefore unprotected if an objectively reasonable person would
interpret the speech as a ‘serious expression of an intent to cause . . . harm.’ ” (quoting Doe v.
Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002))); United States v. Jeffries, 692
F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing test based on perceptions of “reasonable person”);
United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 499 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing “objective ‘reasonable person’
test”); United States v. Nicklas, 713 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 2013) (describing test as whether “a
reasonable recipient would have interpreted the defendant’s communication as a serious
threat”); United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 988 (11th Cir. 2013) (describing test based on
“position of an objective, reasonable person”).
77. See United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing test as
whether “speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat”); United States v. Magleby, 420
F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing test based on “speaker’s intent . . . of placing the
victim in fear of bodily harm or death’ ” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)));
cf. United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 978 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting reasonable-recipient
test but adding requirement that the defendant intend that the recipient feel threatened). But see
United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 743 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015) (denying that subjective-intent
requirement was part of Heineman’s First Amendment analysis).
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this circuit split. 78 The divergence in standards of intent that courts apply in
true threat cases is an alarming issue, and it is one that the Supreme Court
must promptly address. 79 Consistency among lower courts is essential for ensuring that the speech rights of every true threat defendant are adequately and
equally protected. Scholarship debating the merits of the different standards
and proposing new alternatives abounds. 80
But while consistency itself is critical, the formalistic choice between a
subjective- or objective-intent standard may be less impactful in the long
run. 81 Even if instructed to use a subjective-intent standard, triers of fact cannot actually know what the defendant was thinking and therefore will likely
use some baseline “reasonable person” lens to guess at the defendant’s intent. 82
Likewise, testimony or other evidence indicating what the defendant was actually thinking will undoubtedly have some relevance in a trier of fact’s assessment of intent, even under an objective analysis. 83 Additionally, the intent
standard is only a threshold question of law. A judge’s instruction to the jury
on that issue will never be the final word on whether a defendant is guilty. 84
Rather than adding another voice to the existing—and largely formalistic—
debate over intent, this Note focuses primarily on what courts should do once
a case passes that threshold.
78. See supra Section I.C.
79. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 750 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This
failure to decide throws everyone from appellate judges to everyday Facebook users into a state
of uncertainty.”). It is also worth noting that, in 2017, Justice Sotomayor suggested that she believes the First Amendment requires a subjective-intent standard. Perez v. Florida, 137 S. Ct.
853, 855 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“Together, Watts and Black
make clear that . . . some level of intent is required. And these two cases strongly suggest that it
is not enough that a reasonable person might have understood the words as a threat—a jury
must find that the speaker actually intended to convey a threat.”).
80. See, e.g., Scheffey, supra note 46; Crane, supra note 57; Brison, supra note 64; Alex J.
Berkman, Comment, Speech as a Weapon: Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life
Activists and the Need for a Reasonable Listener Standard, 29 TOURO L. REV. 485 (2013); Jennifer
E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283 (2001). Some
advocates have even suggested that a defendant’s speech must be both objectively and subjectively intended to threaten for a conviction to be constitutional. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 3, Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18-949).
81. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the ACLU et al. in Support of Petitioner at 21, Elonis, 575
U.S. 723 (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 4215752 (“Requiring the government to demonstrate subjective
intent to threaten in true threat cases would not substantially hinder its ability to prosecute actually intended threats.”); Crane, supra note 57, at 1276.
82. See generally R. George Wright, Objective and Subjective Tests in the Law, 16 U.N.H.
L. REV. 121, 124 (2017) (“What is thought by the law to be subjective actually pervades and informs, in multiple ways, what is thought to be objective, and vice versa. . . . The law’s attempts,
in various contexts, to differentiate or combine objective and subjective tests are thus inevitably
fruitless.”).
83. See id.
84. See Megan R. Murphy, Comment, Context, Content, Intent: Social Media’s Role in True
Threat Prosecutions, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 746–47 (2020) (“The requirement of subjective and
objective mens rea standards will not resolve the other question left open by Elonis: what evidence
will suffice to prove a subjective intent to put some audience member in fear of serious harm.”).
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B. Standard of Review
That judges struggle to separate true threats from protected speech is unsurprising. As Black made clear, whether a defendant truly “intended” to
threaten is a deeply fact-intensive question, 85 and questions of fact are usually
best left to juries. 86 A criminal defendant’s mental state, in particular, is an
issue that must be decided by the trier of fact based on all direct and circumstantial evidence produced at trial. 87 It is generally not a trial judge’s job to
peer into the mind of the defendant. 88 Even on appeal, a judge should traditionally defer to the factfinder below as much as possible by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and asking only “whether any
rational trier of fact” could have found the defendant guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 89 This division of labor is well justified, 90 and it helps explain why
courts in true threat cases focus mostly on the subjective/objective dimension
of intent: it is strictly a question of law, fit for judicial resolution rather than
jury consideration.
But the usual degree of deference to the finder of fact may not adequately
protect a defendant’s First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has held
that an appellate court considering First Amendment issues must “make an
independent examination of the whole record” to ensure that “the judgment
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” 91
The requirement that courts conduct an independent de novo review of facts
with special constitutional relevance, known as the “constitutional fact doctrine,” 92 is necessitated by the frequent blurriness of the line separating protected speech from unprotected speech. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, the Court explained that giving juries a mere “general description” of speech that is unprotected would not sufficiently guide them in understanding what is and is not punishable, creating too great a danger that
See supra Section I.B.
See STEPHEN E. ARTHUR & ROBERT S. HUNTER, 1 FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK:
CRIMINAL §§ 10:1–:2 (2020–2021 ed. 2020). See generally Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390
(2020) (discussing the origins and meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
87. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 669 (2018).
88. See id.
89. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 583 (2018) (emphasis added).
90. Amanda Reid, Safeguarding Fair Use Through First Amendment’s Asymmetric Constitutional Fact Review, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 23, 27 (2019) (“Deference accords greater
finality to fact-finding, and enhances judicial economy by reducing the frequency of appeals.
Deference promotes efficiency and stability by recognizing the superior institutional competence of the lower court to engage in fact-finding. . . . Lack of deference undermines the legitimacy and finality of the trial process. Lack of deference raises distributive concerns because often
only the wealthy can afford two bites of the apple. And de novo review ultimately renders the
jury a nullity because, without deference, the jury’s role is little more than a dry run.”).
91. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 232 (1963)); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 499 (1984).
92. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 231 (1985).
85.
86.
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their verdicts would “inhibit the expression of protected ideas.” 93 The Court
has also reasoned that jurors are “unlikely to be neutral” when evaluating
speech and ideas that they might find highly offensive but which are nonetheless protected by the Constitution. 94
The Court has applied the constitutional fact doctrine in First Amendment contexts, including defamation lawsuits, 95 obscenity prosecutions, 96 and
more, 97 but it has yet to definitively extend it to true threat cases. Federal
courts of appeals disagree on whether to conduct the special review required
by the constitutional fact doctrine in appeals of true threat convictions, creating yet another source of inconsistency in this area of law. While the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits have held that the doctrine does apply to true threat
cases, 98 the other circuits addressing the issue have generally applied traditional deferential review. 99 State appellate courts are similarly split. 100
Given the near-routine application of the constitutional fact doctrine to
other First Amendment cases, the argument in favor of extending it to true
threat cases is fairly intuitive. As an initial matter, the question of whether a
particular statement is a true threat is itself a “constitutional fact.” The First
Amendment prohibits punishing an individual purely for the content of her
speech (however offensive it may be) unless the speech fits into a category that
the Supreme Court has deemed unprotected, such as true threats. Thus, the
constitutionality of a conviction is inseparable from whether the speech
counts as a true threat. 101
Analogies to other First Amendment applications of the constitutional
fact doctrine also support its extension to true threats. For example, a threat
charge implicates speech rights to the same extent as an obscenity charge because pure speech serves as grounds for criminal punishment in both situations. In fact, compared with civil defamation lawsuits—another area where
93. Bose, 466 U.S. at 505.
94. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971).
95. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Bose, 466 U.S. 485.
96. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
97. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
567 (1995); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
335 (1946).
98. United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 457–58 (4th Cir. 2007); Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
99. United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jeffries, 692
F.3d 473, 481 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Schiefen, 139 F.3d 638, 639 (8th Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit has not weighed in
definitively, but it has noted the uncertainty around the issue and floated the possibility that an
appellate court might have the discretion, but not the duty, to conduct an independent review
of constitutional facts. United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 2013).
100. Compare People v. Stanley, 170 P.3d 782, 790 (Colo. App. 2007) (applying constitutional fact doctrine), with Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 30 A.3d 1105, 1110 (Pa. 2011) (applying
traditional sufficiency-of-evidence standard of review).
101. See supra and infra this whole Note.
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the constitutional fact doctrine is applied as a matter of course—threat prosecutions actually risk greater burdens on speech. In the true threat case, removing the defendant’s speech from the First Amendment’s protected sphere
would result in her imprisonment or other criminal sanction, whereas a defamation defendant usually risks only monetary loss.
Another reason for appellate courts to independently review the constitutional fact of a true threat is the extraordinary ambiguity about what counts
as a “true threat.” The Supreme Court did not even conjure a definition for
such threats until 2003, 102 yet we expect jurors to know one when they see one.
The task is simply too hard and too important; another layer of protection is
necessary. This is not to say the jury’s verdict does not matter. Appellate
judges are well aware of the traditional sanctity of a jury verdict and will hesitate to vacate it even when reviewing the record de novo. 103 But judges can
nonetheless look at the facts underlying the conviction “with the commands
of the First Amendment clearly in mind” 104 in a way that a jury simply cannot.
In true threat cases, they should.
The argument against applying the constitutional fact doctrine to true
threats is unclear, as courts that have declined to do so have not provided detailed reasons for their decisions. For example, in United States v. Wheeler, the
Tenth Circuit simply said that “whether statements amount to true threats ‘is
a question generally best left to a jury,’ ” unless there is an “unusual set of
facts.” 105 The court did not explain why the constitutional fact doctrine should
not apply to true threat cases, stating merely that it would follow Tenth Circuit
precedent in which the court had declined to conduct independent review. 106
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits also used the sufficiency-of-evidence
standard without even mentioning the possibility of de novo review of the
constitutional fact of a true threat. 107
De novo review of the fact finder’s determination that a statement constitutes a true threat maximizes protection of a defendant’s speech rights and
aligns with Supreme Court precedent regarding when to apply the constitutional fact doctrine. But, like the subjective/objective intent question, the
question of the appropriate standard of review on appeal is a formalistic and
preliminary one that will not solve the true threat doctrine’s most important
problems. The degree to which an appellate court scrutinizes the record below
hardly matters if the court does not know which facts are relevant to the true

102. See supra Section I.B.
103. Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment
Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1370 (2006).
104. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
105. United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 742 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1994)).
106. Id. (citing United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 397 (10th Cir. 1999)).
107. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 481 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Parr, 545
F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Schiefen, 139 F.3d 638, 639 (8th Cir. 1998).
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threat designation. Thus, courts have to face the next frontier of judicial confusion within this ungainly doctrine: context.
C. Contextual Analysis
The last major problem area within the true threat doctrine—and the one
that most significantly impacts whether or not a statement qualifies as a true
threat—is the contextual analysis called for by the Supreme Court’s muddled
true threat precedent. In Watts, Black, and Elonis, the Court emphasized that
“context matters.” 108 By and large, courts have properly recited this broad instruction to consider contextual factors in true threat cases. 109 But which context matters, and how much does it matter? This Section compares opinions
from various federal courts of appeals to determine which contextual factors,
if any, recur in their evaluations of true threat defendants’ intent.
Before surveying courts’ approaches to context, a word on the scope of
this analysis. Due to the sheer ubiquity of statutes that criminalize threats, it
is not feasible to collect every case in which a defendant has been convicted
for making a true threat. Indeed, the abundance of threat convictions in the
United States underscores the true threat doctrine’s extraordinary power and
the government’s reliance on it to punish criminal behavior. Looking at federal law alone, the true threat doctrine has enabled convictions for threats
against the president, 110 threats to kidnap or injure, 111 stalking, 112 blocking access to reproductive health clinics, 113 and more. 114 Because state statutes criminalizing different forms of threats are even more numerous, 115 this Section
focuses only on contextual factors repeatedly identified by federal appellate
court case law.

108. Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 747 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
109. United States v. Syring, 522 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D.D.C. 2007) (discussing how several circuits analyze threats in their “entire factual context”).
110. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (affirming conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 871).
111. See United States v. Khan, 937 F.3d 1042 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 875).
112. See United States v. Ackell, 907 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 2261A).
113. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (affirming conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 248).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Coss, 677 F.3d 278 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming conviction under federal statute banning threats to injure the reputation of another with intent to extort
money); United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction under federal statute banning threats involving animal enterprises).
115. See, e.g., John P. Ludington, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Terroristic
Threat Statutes, 45 A.L.R.4TH 949 (1986); Erin Masson Wirth, Annotation, Imposition of State
or Local Penalties for Threatening to Use Explosive Devices at Schools or Other Buildings, 79
A.L.R.5TH 1 (2000).
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The Supreme Court’s opinions in Watts and Black highlight a few specific
factors relevant to the contextual analysis. In holding that the defendant’s
speech threatening to shoot LBJ was not a true threat, the Watts Court noted
the location of the defendant’s statement in the “political arena,” the “expressly conditional” nature of his statement, and the fact that listeners laughed
in reaction to his statement. 116 The Black Court highlighted factors such as the
defendant’s stated purpose, the size of the defendant’s audience, and the location where the speech occurred. 117 These factors are a starting point, but nothing in Watts or Black suggests that courts should be limited to them. To the
contrary, Black seemed to encourage as much consideration of context as possible. 118 Justice Alito’s Elonis opinion heeded that recommendation, as it mentioned several factors that do not fit perfectly in the Watts and Black boxes. 119
The federal circuit courts have also identified contextual factors relevant
to the true threat analysis. The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Dinwiddie,
provided a comprehensive—though explicitly nonexhaustive and nondispositive—list of factors to be considered in reviewing a true threat conviction. 120
These factors include how the threat recipient and other listeners reacted,
whether the threat was conditional, whether the threat was made directly to
its target, whether the speaker made similar statements to the recipient in the
past, and whether the recipient had reason to believe that the speaker was
prone to violence. 121 In upholding the constitutionality of the defendant’s conviction, the Dinwiddie court emphasized that she had directly repeated her
threats about fifty times to her intended target. 122
Dinwiddie’s list of factors frequently appears in other opinions analyzing
true threats. 123 The Third Circuit’s rehearing of Elonis following the Supreme
Court’s remand is one example. 124 There, the court highlighted the efforts of
Elonis’s ex-wife to seek a restraining order against him after he made the alleged threats, 125 exemplifying the relevance of the “reaction of the recipient of
the threat.” 126 It also noted the history of Elonis’s violent statements toward
his ex-wife, 127 mirroring the category of “similar statements to the victim in

116. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
117. See supra text accompanying note 54.
118. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
120. 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996).
121. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Syring, 522 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D.D.C. 2007); Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1078
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); State v. Taylor, 841 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. Ct. App.), rev’d, No. 156PA20,
2021 WL 5984471 (N.C. 2021).
124. United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 67 (2017).
125. Id. at 598.
126. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925.
127. Elonis, 841 F.3d at 598.

February 2022]

Searching for Truth in True Threat Doctrine

737

the past” from Dinwiddie. 128 These considerations, among others, led the
Third Circuit to find only harmless error in the jury instruction and to uphold
Elonis’s conviction. 129 Similarly, in United States v. Clemens, the First Circuit
upheld a true threat conviction and noted that the threat recipients “did in fact
feel fear” that the defendant would harm them and reacted “to protect themselves.” 130 Clemens, along with Watts and Dinwiddie, thus exemplifies judicial
reliance on the listeners’ reaction as a key contextual factor.
To be clear, courts do not limit themselves to the precise Dinwiddie list or
any similar iteration of factors. Instead, they generally stress the need to consider “the whole factual context and all the circumstances bearing on a
threat.”131 In practice, this seems to mean accounting for any factor that feels
relevant to the court on a case-by-case basis. For example, in United States v.
Wheeler, the defendant was charged for posting on social media and urging
his “religious operatives” to “commit a massacre” at a preschool and day
care. 132 The Tenth Circuit found that these statements were punishable true
threats based partly on a contextual factor it referred to as “the collective consciousness,” which in modern times “includes recent massacres at educational
and other institutions by active shooters.” 133 Another example of a court looking at non-Dinwiddie context is United States v. Turner, in which the defendant
was charged for a blog post declaring that three Seventh Circuit judges deserved to die for their recent holding on a Second Amendment issue. 134 In
upholding that defendant’s conviction as constitutional, the Second Circuit
emphasized his publication of photographs, work addresses, and room numbers of the targeted judges. 135 The court in Turner seemed to view the specificity
of the threat as important context and thus accounted for it in its true threat
analysis, 136 though this did not fall cleanly into any of the Dinwiddie factors.
This free-for-all approach to considering context is common, yet it is far
from ideal. Even when judges look at the same factual record, there is substantial space for disagreement about which factors matter and what they mean.
United States v. Bagdasarian exemplifies this issue. 137 Defendant Walter Bagdasarian, “an especially unpleasant fellow,” was convicted in the trial court for
viciously racist statements about Barack Obama anonymously posted to an
online message board. 138 One message said Obama would “have a 50 cal in the

128. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925.
129. Elonis, 841 F.3d at 598.
130. United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013).
131. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
132. United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2015).
133. Id.
134. United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 2013).
135. Id. at 423.
136. Id.
137. 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011).
138. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1115–16.
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head soon” and another called for Obama to be shot. 139 These posts were reported to the Secret Service, which investigated and eventually found six guns
(including a .50 caliber rifle) at Bagdasarian’s home. 140 They also discovered
that on the day Obama was elected, the defendant sent emails referring to
shooting Obama’s car. 141
The Ninth Circuit panel in Bagdasarian agreed on the pure legal questions about intent and standard of review, but Judge Wardlaw dissented from
the majority’s interpretation of the case’s key context. The majority was ultimately unpersuaded that Bagdasarian’s posts rose to the level of a true
threat. 142 It acknowledged the violence of the posts but determined that they
were merely exhortations or predictions. 143 Similarly, the majority thought
that neither Bagdasarian’s possession of a gun nor his anonymity in posting
were enough to prove his specific intent to threaten Obama, particularly because the board to which Bagdasarian posted was “a non-violent discussion
forum that would tend to blunt any perception that statements made there
were serious expressions of intended violence.” 144 Judge Wardlaw took the opposite view. She would have held Bagdasarian’s statements were true threats
and upheld his conviction based on the very contextual factors that the majority had dismissed: the readers’ perception of the posts as threatening, Bagdasarian’s access to .50 caliber firearms when he made the post, and
Bagdasarian’s choice to hide behind a “cloak of anonymity” until the Secret
Service found him. 145
The source of disagreement in Bagdasarian was not whether to consider
context or even what context to consider. Instead, the judges differed in their
evaluation of what the context meant and whether it proved a true threat. To
some extent, differing interpretations of a set of facts are inevitable. But the
dearth of guidance in how judges should weigh key contextual factors makes
such disagreements infinitely more likely, which is unacceptable when the defendant’s liberty and speech rights are at stake.

139. Id. at 1115.
140. Id. at 1115–16.
141. Id. at 1116.
142. Id. at 1115.
143. See id. at 1123 (“Given that Bagdasarian’s statements . . . fail to express any intent on
his part to take any action, the fact that he possessed the weapons is not sufficient to establish
that he intended to threaten Obama himself. [The Election Day emails] simply provide additional information—weblinks to a video of debris and two junked cars being blown up and to an
advertisement for assault rifles available for purchase online—that Bagdasarian may have believed would tend to encourage the email’s recipient to take violent action against Obama.
But . . . incitement to kill or injure a presidential candidate does not qualify as an offense under
§ 879(a)(3).”).
144. Id. at 1121, 1123.
145. Id. at 1128–31 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

February 2022]

Searching for Truth in True Threat Doctrine

739

D. A Case Study: Commonwealth v. Knox
Because every true threat case requires intensive analysis of context, a
granular look at a single case may be more enlightening than a zoomed-out
observation of the factors that courts consider. Accordingly, this Section dissects Commonwealth v. Knox, a case that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided in 2018 and that the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear in 2019. 146
Point-by-point analysis of the Knox opinion reveals the practical impact of the
true threat doctrine’s overall inscrutability. The doctrine’s confusions are exacerbated by factual records involving things like social media, rap music, and
political controversies—all of which are overwhelmingly common in modern
American society, yet exceedingly difficult for judges to decode.
1.

Facts and Procedural Posture

In the summer of 2012, teenager Jamal Knox recorded a rap song entitled
“F--k the Police.” 147 The lyrics were his own, though the song’s theme was
hardly original. 148 Knox had been arrested in April of that year and charged
with several unrelated criminal offenses; at the time he recorded the rap, those
charges were pending. 149
Knox’s rap expressed anger toward police in general, but also called for
violence against two particular Pittsburgh officers: Officer Michael Kosko and
Detective Daniel Zeltner. 150 Kosko and Zeltner were both slated to testify
against Knox at a hearing arising from his pending criminal charges. 151 Before
the hearing, a third party uploaded a video of Knox’s rap to YouTube and
posted it to a publicly viewable Facebook page. 152 A police officer monitoring
that Facebook page saw the video and showed it to Zeltner and Kosko. 153 Knox
was subsequently arrested and charged with witness intimidation and making
“terroristic threats” pursuant to Pennsylvania state law. 154 At a bench trial, a
Pennsylvania judge found Knox guilty of both charges. 155 Knox appealed, and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the rap
qualified as a true threat. 156
146. 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018).
147. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1149.
148. In 1988, rap group N.W.A. released a song entitled “Fuck Tha Police” that has had
widespread cultural impact. See Rich Goldstein, A Brief History of the Phrase ‘F*ck the Police,’
DAILY BEAST (Apr. 14, 2017, 3:09 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/a-brief-history-of-thephrase-fck-the-police [perma.cc/9KL7-38HE].
149. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1148–49.
150. Id. at 1149.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1150.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1151.
156. Id. at 1152.
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Threshold Issues

The Knox court first had to resolve the preliminary issues that remain unsettled within the true threat doctrine: the intent requirement and the standard of appellate review. First, the court relied on Black to hold that the First
Amendment requires a state to prove that a defendant subjectively and “specifically intended to terrorize or intimidate” in order to convict a defendant of
a true threat. 157 This placed Pennsylvania state courts squarely on the subjective-intent side of the circuit split discussed in Section II.A.
Next, the court opted to conduct an independent review of constitutional
facts, though not in so many words. It noted that “whether a statement constitutes a true threat” is a “circumstance-dependent . . . mixed question of fact and
law.” 158 Further, the court expressly classified “the scope of the true-threat doctrine” as a legal question that it should review de novo. 159 Its reasoning for this
was rather cursory, though it cited a prior decision that discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional fact doctrine in First Amendment contexts at
greater length. 160 In any case, the court did seek to independently review the facts
(nominally, at least) as it turned to the more difficult task of contextual analysis.
3.

Contextual Analysis

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court directly embraced the U.S. Supreme
Court’s emphasis on context, examining “contextual circumstances such as
those referenced in Watts” in order to determine whether the trial court’s
finding of an intent to threaten was supported by competent evidence. 161 But
first, the court looked at Knox’s actual words. 162 The court recited and examined the lyrics in great detail to conclude that, on their face, the lyrics were
threatening and personalized toward the police, and toward Zeltner and
Kosko in particular. 163 One might wonder whether any judges are really suited
to the job of interpreting amateur rap lyrics, and in fact rap scholars and rappers raised this very question in an amicus brief to the cert petition. 164 Even
157. Id. at 1158.
158. Id. at 1152.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing In re Condemnation by Urb. Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, 913 A.2d
178, 183 (Pa. 2006) (“We note that the United States Supreme Court has stated that in reviewing
First Amendment cases, appellate court[s] must conduct a review of the entire record.”)).
161. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1158.
162. Id. (“We first review the content of the speech itself, beginning with the lyrics.”).
163. Id. at 1158–59.
164. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Michael
Render (“Killer Mike”), Erik Nielson & Other Artists & Scholars in Support of Petitioner at 17,
Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 1115837 [hereinafter Killer
Mike Amicus Brief]. For in-depth criticisms of the use of raps as the bases for convictions (and
true threat convictions in particular), see Erin Lutes, James Purdon & Henry F. Fradella, When
Music Takes the Stand: A Content Analysis of How Courts Use and Misuse Rap Lyrics in Criminal
Cases, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 77 (2019); Clay Calvert, Emma Morehart & Sarah Papadelias, Rap Music
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the court acknowledged the special history of rap music and its tendency to
feature violent imagery that is, in many cases, not meant to be taken literally. 165
Nonetheless, the court held that Knox’s rap was “of a different nature and
quality” than the many violent but non–true threat rap songs out there. 166
First, the court characterized several of the rap’s lines—including “[l]et’s kill
these cops cuz they don’t do us no good,” “that whole department can get it,”
and “jam this rusty knife all in [the officer’s] guts”—as “unambiguous threats”
to the police, as opposed to expressions of mere satire or irony, generalized
animosity, or social commentary. 167 Second, the court argued that the lyrics
went “beyond the realm of fantasy or fiction” because Knox rapped that he
wanted the city to “believe” him and that the threats would become “real.” 168
Third, the court highlighted the rap’s explicit naming of two specific officers,
as well as references to the time the officers’ shifts ended and the identities of
their confidential informants. 169 As an aside, the court also noted that the
sounds of gunfire and police sirens in the background of the song exacerbated
its threatening effect. 170
Only after this extensive textual evaluation of the rap did the court turn
to context, to which it devoted only three paragraphs. Such a cursory analysis
of context misses the point. That the words themselves were threatening is
necessary but not sufficient for finding a true threat—they must be accompanied by context that affirmatively supports classifying the speech as a true
threat, rather than just failing to rebut it. 171 Citing to Watts and state-law precedent, the Knox court focused on only four contextual factors: whether the
threat was conditional, whether the threat was communicated directly to the
and the True Threats Quagmire: When Does One Man’s Lyric Become Another’s Crime?, 38
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2014); Andrea Dennis, Poetic (In)justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life,
and Criminal Evidence, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2007); and Andrew Jensen Kerr, Art Threats
and First Amendment Disruption, 16 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 173 (2021).
165. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160 (“We acknowledge that . . . rap music often contains violent
imagery that is not necessarily meant to represent an intention on the singer’s part to carry
through with the actions described. This follows from the fact that music is a form of art and
‘[a]rtists frequently adopt mythical or real-life characters as alter egos or fictional personas.’ We
do not overlook the unique history and social environment from which rap arose, the fact that
rap artists (like many other artists) may adopt a stage persona that is distinct from who they are
as an individual, or the fact that musical works of various types may include violent references,
fictitious or fanciful descriptions of criminal conduct, boasting, exaggeration, and expressions
of hatred, bitterness, or a desire for revenge. In many instances, lyrics along such lines cannot
reasonably be understood as a sincere expression of the singer’s intent to engage in real-world
violence.” (cleaned up) (quoting Dennis, supra note 164, at 23)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1158.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1159.
170. Id.
171. Cf. In re S.W., 45 A.3d 151, 157 (D.C. 2012) (“[A] determination of what a defendant
actually said is just the beginning of a threats analysis. Even when words are threatening on their
face, careful attention must be paid to the context in which those statements are made to determine if the words may be objectively perceived as threatening.”).
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victim, whether the victim had reason to believe the speaker had a propensity
to engage in violence, and how the listeners reacted to the speech. 172
With respect to the first factor, the court found without explanation that
Knox’s threat was “mostly unconditional.” 173 The court then jumped to an
evaluation of the listeners’ reaction to the speech, noting that the officer who
first viewed the video immediately shared it with the colleagues Knox had
named, who then took protective measures. 174 Despite the video’s public accessibility, the court mentioned no listeners other than the police officers, particularly the targeted officers, who were hardly disinterested bystanders in this
interaction. 175 This application of the “listeners’ reaction” factor differs from
Watts, where the Court focused on listeners who had no stake in the relationship between the speaker and the alleged target (in that case, President Johnson). 176 Nonetheless, the court in Knox was easily satisfied that the police
reactions to the speech supported its categorization as a true threat.
The Knox court next examined the second contextual factor on its list:
direct communication of the threat to its target. But, again, the court spent
little time on its purported independent review. 177 It acknowledged that Knox
did not send or speak the rap directly to Zeltner, Kosko, or any other police
officers. 178 To the contrary, the video was posted broadly to YouTube by
someone other than Knox, then reposted (again, by someone other than
Knox) to a public Facebook page that police happened to be monitoring. 179
Still, the court found that Knox may have intended that police officers would
hear the rap, pointing to the lower courts’ finding that Knox’s “prior course of
conduct suggested [he and his co-writer] either intended for the song to be
published or knew publication was inevitable.” 180
The court’s cursory analysis of this key contextual factor demonstrates the
inadequacy of a free-for-all approach to contextual analyses. The court
seemed to defer substantially to the courts below in assessing the directness of
the threat; this makes little sense given the conceded need to independently
examine the whole record when speech rights are at stake, 181 the conflict between how the superior court and trial court interpreted the evidence on this

172. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1159.
173. Id. The court was presumably relying on its earlier discussion of the lyrics themselves,
but it is unclear which lines it was focusing on.
174. Id.
175. The focus on police reactions also exacerbates the potential for racial bias to enter into
the court’s decisionmaking. See infra notes 195–201 and accompanying test.
176. See supra Section I.A.
177. See supra Section II.D.1.
178. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160.
179. See supra Section II.D.2.
180. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160.
181. See supra note 160.
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issue, 182 and the new and complex questions raised in this sphere by social
media and internet technology. 183 The record itself attests to the complicated
background here. At trial, the state failed to prove that Knox himself posted
the video, 184 and the chain of events that led to the targeted officers watching
the video was long and convoluted. 185 That is not to say that a thorough analysis of this factor would have definitively altered the verdict. Indeed, a concurring justice examined the context surrounding this issue in much greater
detail and reached the same conclusion. 186 But the fact that the majority set out
to conduct an independent review of the whole record, explicitly including
this factor of direct communication of the threat, yet failed to thoroughly do
so reflects a serious shortcoming in current true threat jurisprudence.
As for the third factor, whether the victim had reason to believe the
speaker had a propensity to engage in violence, the court again provided only
a brief analysis. The majority noted as “relevant” the fact that Zeltner and Kosko
“were aware a loaded firearm” was found in Knox’s car during his initial arrest
back in April 2012. 187 This was all the court had to say on the matter. There
was no history of Knox actually being violent toward the police officers, nor
was there any mention of prior criminal offenses other than the April 2012
arrest that preceded the rap recording. 188 It is also worth noting that Knox was
just a teenager at the time of his arrest. 189 Still, the court seemed to think Knox’s
perceived propensity for violence unambiguously supported its ultimate finding that he had made a true threat, as it went on to affirm his conviction. 190

182. Brief for Appellant at 20–21, Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (No. 3 WAP) (“The Trial Court did
not render any findings of fact as to who uploaded the FTP Recording to the YouTube Account,
or as to who posted the Link to the Facebook Page. The Trial Court found that Knox authored
and created an audio recording of the Song, and that Knox thereby directly or indirectly communicated the Song with the intent to threaten police. The Superior Court’s factual findings are
inconsistent with those of the Trial Court in this regard. The Superior Court found that the evidence was sufficient to find that [Knox’s co-writer] Beasley uploaded the FTP Recording to the
YouTube Account and posted the Link to the Facebook Page. The Superior Court thereby found
that Knox indirectly communicated the Song with the knowledge that the Song would be viewed
by police or by a third party who would share it with police.” (citations omitted)).
183. See Murphy, supra note 84; Matt Kass, Note, Elonis v. United States: At the Crossroads
of First Amendment and Criminal Jurisprudence in the Digital Age, 43 RUTGERS COMPUT. &
TECH. L.J. 110 (2017).
184. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1168 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. at 1148–50 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 1169–71 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is worth noting
that Justice Wecht dissented only on the threshold question of the intent requirement, and it was
his analysis of context that led him to the same result. In this way, his opinion exemplifies this
Part’s argument that the intent requirement is not the be-all and end-all of the true threat debate.
187. Id. at 1160 (majority opinion).
188. See id. at 1148–49.
189. Brief for Appellant, supra note 182, at 13.
190. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1161.

744

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:721

III. STANDARDIZING CONTEXTUAL ANALYSES: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
IDENTIFYING TRUE THREATS
It is, by now, axiomatic that context matters in true threat prosecutions.
Knox and federal appellate case law show, however, that courts have failed to
develop a coherent approach to conducting this contextual analysis. Such incoherence is likely to continue to infect the doctrine regardless of whether
courts opt for a subjective- or objective-intent requirement, or whether they
examine the record below de novo or not. This Wild West of whatever context
a particular judge sees as important is not sufficiently protective of the speech
interests at stake in true threat cases. This Part proposes a four-part framework to address this problem.
A. Knox and the Need for Reform
First, it is worth asking whether a solution is even possible or if this amalgam of contextual factors is just the best we can do. After all, totality-of-thecircumstances analyses are quite common in constitutional criminal law. 191
Professor Kenneth Karst, in his comprehensive overview of the true threat
doctrinal landscape as of 2006, concluded that this is simply an area where the
law must be beholden to the facts. 192 He argued that judges and juries with
decades of human experience will be able to look at the context and reach a
socially acceptable conclusion about what is an unprotected threat and what
is not. 193 Essentially, Karst told us to trust the process.
This conclusion is hard to bear when the process is hardly a process at all.
As shown in Part II, appellate courts simply address whichever factors they
view as relevant and give them whatever weight they feel is appropriate. Karst
is correct that this is inevitable to some degree; judges must use their judgment. But to have no framework guiding the application of that judgment puts
speech rights at too great a risk because, practically speaking, implicit (or explicit) bias is free to enter the equation. The likelihood of such bias in First
Amendment cases is the impetus for the constitutional fact doctrine, through
which the Supreme Court directs judges to vigilantly prevent the punishment
of protected but unpopular speech. 194 Still, judges are not immune to antipathy toward upsetting speech. And giving parties notice about what an appellate court considers when reviewing true threat convictions will help litigants
decide what evidence to enter into the record in the first place, ensuring that
courts have full information about the context of the speech at issue.

191. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (holding that due-process test for evaluating voluntariness of defendant’s confession takes into consideration the totality of the surrounding circumstances); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (mandating
totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable-cause analyses).
192. Karst, supra note 103, at 1411.
193. Id. at 1368–70.
194. See supra Section II.B.
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Viewed cynically, Knox demonstrates the risk of unstructured contextual
analyses in true threat cases. Antipolice rhetoric is historically unpopular in
America, 195 and given the long history of judicial deference to police, 196 it is
not outlandish to expect judges to be similarly unreceptive to speech like
Knox’s rap lyrics. 197 Furthermore, the fact that Knox is a young Black man
who was participating in a musical genre culturally associated with young
Black men should not be overlooked. 198 In addition to making it less likely that
the lyrics were meant literally, the rap context may trigger racial bias and “enduring stereotypes about the criminality of young [B]lack men” to an extent
that other forms of expression may not. 199 Indeed, police only found the video
at issue because they were monitoring the Facebook page of Knox’s rap alias, 200
a virtual version of the physical surveillance that Black Americans have been
subjected to for centuries. 201 This history leads one to question the fairness of
heavily weighing the police reaction to Knox’s speech as a factor in determining whether his speech was protected. Yet the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
did so uncritically. Part of the problem may have been that the briefs did not

195. EMILY EKINS, CATO INST., POLICING IN AMERICA 8 (2016), https://www.cato.org
/sites/cato.org/files/survey-reports/pdf/policing-in-america-august-1-2017.pdf [perma.cc/3UMPW845] (“[M]ost Americans (64%) have favorable attitudes toward their local police department
and are confident their local police use the appropriate amount of force (58%), are courteous
(57%) and honest (57%), treat all racial groups equally (56%), protect people from violent crime
(56%), respond quickly to a call for help (56%), and care about community members (55%).”).
That said, attitudes may be changing in the wake of 2020’s backlash against police that followed
the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police, along with other police killings of Black
men and women. See Aimee Ortiz, Confidence in Police Is at Record Low, Gallup Survey Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/gallup-poll-police.html
[perma.cc/J4GN-YMY5].
196. See generally Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 1995 (2017).
197. The relative lack of diversity of the judiciary may contribute to this issue as well. See
Examining the Demographic Compositions of U.S. Circuit and District Courts, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Feb. 13, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports
/2020/02/13/480112/examining-demographic-compositions-u-s-circuit-district-courts [perma.cc
/3ASV-CE9C] (noting that people of color make up just 20 percent of all judges sitting on Article
III circuit and district courts). When white judges from similar backgrounds dominate the
bench, their general attitudes toward a particular viewpoint are likely to dominate as well.
198. See Killer Mike Amicus Brief, supra note 164; see also Ekins, supra note 195 (noting
that Black Americans disproportionately experience verbal and physical misconduct by police).
199. Killer Mike Amicus Brief, supra note 164, at 19–20 (“Research tells us that listeners
unfamiliar with hip hop culture may have difficulty being reasonable when it comes to rap music
because it often primes enduring stereotypes about the criminality of young [B]lack men, its
primary creators. In the criminal justice system, the results of this racial bias are evident in the
disparate treatment that people of color face at virtually every phase of the criminal justice process. When it comes to rap, research reveals similar disparities.”).
200. See supra Section II.D.1.
201. See, e.g., Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016, 5:55 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2016/01/what-the-fbis-surveillance-of-martin-luther-king-saysabout-modern-spying.html [perma.cc/U28B-RFKJ].
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discuss these deeply divisive issues at length, but this is likely due to uncertainty about whether they would count as “context” for true threat purposes.
Knox also shows how judges may underestimate the importance of new
technology and online communication. The majority apparently did not find
it significant that there was no clear evidence as to whether Knox actually posted
the video or even knew of its posting. The majority also failed to extensively
discuss the indirectness of the alleged threat. The rap was recorded, posted to
Facebook by a third party, viewed by a police officer, then shown to the
threat’s targets. 202 Though not dispositive by any means, the presence of
online media as the vehicle for the threat at least warranted greater judicial
attention.
Given that the contextual inquiry is so crucial to protecting constitutional
speech rights in true threat cases, this Note proposes a way to mitigate the
potential bias and inexpertness hampering the contextual inquiry and to give
notice to parties about what evidence is relevant.
B. Proposed Four-Part Framework
Scholars have proposed various solutions to reduce the difficulty and unpredictability of asking courts to analyze context in true threat cases. Most
commonly, these proposals involve identifying specific factors that courts
should consider at some point in their contextual analyses. 203 But a list of discretionary factors would do little to solve the inconsistency across cases. Cherrypicking from such lists is essentially the approach courts currently use, and it
is far too messy. 204 Moreover, there will inevitably be cases where some of the
major factors are completely irrelevant and others where the record involves
such atypical facts that a conventional list of factors would be utterly unhelpful. More drastic proposals, such as adding a new category of unprotected
threatening speech 205 or enabling defendants to assert context as an affirmative
defense, 206 have the potential to clarify this convoluted doctrine, but none
have garnered consensus. Thus, in the spirit of a marketplace of ideas, this
Note offers a new alternative: borrowing an analytical framework (rather than

202. See supra Section II.D.1.
203. See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I🔫🔫U: Considering the
Context of Online Threats, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1885, 1923–25 (2018); Jordan Strauss, Context Is
Everything: Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating True Threats Under the First Amendment, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 231 (2003); Scott Hammack, Note, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and
Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 98–99 (2002); Rothman, supra note 80, at 333–35.
204. See supra Section II.C.
205. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Martin, Comment, Deconstructing “Constructive Threats”: Classification and Analysis of Threatening Speech After Watts and Planned Parenthood, 31 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 751 (2000).
206. Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 203, at 1925 (“The defense would work as follows. Once
the accused is charged with making a criminal threat, the accused may invoke context as a defense to liability.”).
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a list of factors) from another important First Amendment doctrine, namely,
defamation.
Defamation, or false speech that tends to harm the reputation of its subject, is a well-established tort at common law. 207 Defamatory statements remain an unprotected category of speech, and the modern Supreme Court has
devoted significant effort to aligning its boundaries with First Amendment
principles. 208 The Court generally deems defamation penalties constitutional
only when a plaintiff affirmatively proves that the speech at issue was verifiably false. 209 But, as it turns out, determining whether a particular statement is
true or false is often easier said than done. For this reason, courts’ efforts to
determine whether a defamatory statement is “false” provides a path for courts
analogously seeking to determine whether a threat is “true.”
In the 1974 case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court made a sweeping
declaration that would haunt it for decades: “Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas.” 210 Lower courts interpreted this language to mean that statements of “opinion” were distinguishable from statements of fact, and so were categorically protected from any defamation
action. 211 Simply put, if a court understood a defendant’s speech to be an opinion rather than a factual assertion, the defendant could not be liable as a matter
of law. While the Court repudiated this interpretation of Gertz sixteen years
later in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 212 the efforts of lower courts to draw
the line between fact and opinion during those intervening years are nonetheless relevant points of comparison for the purposes of this Note.

207. See 8A STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS § 29:2 (2020).
208. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
209. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (“[A] privatefigure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before recovering
damages for defamation from a media defendant. To do otherwise could ‘only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.’ ” (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958))).
210. 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974).
211. See Len Niehoff & Ashley Messenger, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Twenty-Five Years
Later: The Slow, Quiet, and Troubled Demise of Liar Libel, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 467, 467
(2016) (noting “lower courts’ longstanding interpretation of Gertz v. Robert Welch as creating a
separate constitutional privilege for expressions of opinion” (footnote omitted)); Robert D. Sack,
Protection of Opinion Under the First Amendment: Reflections on Alfred Hill, “Defamation and
Privacy Under the First Amendment,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 315 (2000).
212. See 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (“[W]e do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to
create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion.’ ”). That
said, the actual effect of Milkovich on the Gertz fact/opinion distinction is still unclear and is a
topic of scholarly debate in its own right. See Niehoff & Messenger, supra note 211.
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Ollman v. Evans: The Template Test

During the time between Gertz and Milkovich, the D.C. Circuit issued a
decision that was, for a time, the leading approach to distinguishing protected
statements of opinion from unprotected false statements of fact. Ollman v.
Evans involved a university professor who sued two newspaper columnists for
publishing a nationally syndicated column suggesting that he was using the
classroom to politically indoctrinate students with his Marxist beliefs. 213 The
columnists argued that they could not be held liable because the column reflected only their “opinions” about the professor’s work. 214 In his plurality
opinion for the en banc court, Judge Starr stressed the impossibility of identifying “a bright-line or mechanical distinction” between facts and opinions
while also emphasizing that ad hoc decisions and overly complex rules would
be useless in protecting the speech rights at stake. 215 The same can be said for
true threat analyses.
Given the impossibility of a simple bright-line rule, Judge Starr set out a
four-part test for evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding an
allegedly defamatory statement and assessing whether an average reader
would regard the statement as fact or opinion. 216 The first step was to “analyze
the common usage or meaning of the specific language of the challenged statement itself.” 217 Under this step, statements that could be interpreted many different ways would be unlikely to support an action for defamation. 218 The
second step was whether the statement was “capable of being objectively characterized as true or false.” 219 The third step was to look at the “unchallenged
language surrounding the allegedly defamatory statement,” such as cautionary
or interrogative language, to examine how it could “influence the average
reader’s readiness to infer that a particular statement has factual content.” 220
The final step was to “consider the broader context or setting in which the
statement appears”—for example, whether it appeared in the opinion section
of a newspaper as opposed to the front page. 221 Several other courts embraced
this formulation, sometimes short-handing the four steps as (1) specificity, (2)
verifiability, (3) literary context, and (4) public or social context. 222

213. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 971–73 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 977–78.
216. Id. at 979.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 979, 984.
222. See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1989); Henderson
v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 359 (D. Colo. 1987), aff’d, 876 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1989);
Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 501 N.E.2d 550, 555–56 (N.Y. 1986).

Searching for Truth in True Threat Doctrine

February 2022]

2.

749

Tweaking the Ollman Test for True Threats

The goal of the Ollman test was to organize an all-encompassing analysis
of the factual record into a logical process to answer a single question: Is the
challenged speech protected by the First Amendment? Any true threat test
must address the same question. Thus, the Ollman test—carefully crafted by
an en banc D.C. Circuit plurality and further refined by other courts following
its lead—is a more solid foundation for true threat analyses than any ad hoc
list of factors that appears in true threat precedent. But adjustments to the
Ollman test will of course be necessary given that its ultimate distinction between “fact” and “opinion” differs from the distinction of “true threat” versus—well, everything else.
The first Ollman step of “specificity” translates quite well to true threat
analysis. If the common meaning of the statement does not facially reflect a
specific threat to harm someone or something, then the inquiry should stop
there and the defendant should not be convicted. Watts, the case that started
it all, can serve as an example. The key statement at issue there was “[i]f they
ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J.”223
This statement was, at least on its face, a specific threat to shoot President
Lyndon B. Johnson. If Watts had instead said “if they ever make me carry a
rifle, I’ll go berserk,” there would have been no specific threat. 224 Knox, too,
exemplifies the importance of specificity. If Knox had not used the individual
officers’ names in the rap, it is unlikely he could have been constitutionally
punished for the speech, violent and angry as it may have been.
Second in the Ollman framework is “verifiability.” In literal terms, this
step does not make much sense in the context of threats, as a threat is by definition predictive of something that has not yet occurred rather than descriptive of something that has already occurred. One possible way to adapt
“verifiability” would be to ask whether the defendant actually intended or
made efforts to carry out the threat. Evidence of such an intent or effort would
theoretically render the seriousness of the threat more “verifiable.” But the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the relevance of the defendant’s intent to
carry out the threat in Black. 225 Instead, “feasibility” could fill in for verifiability in threat analyses, with courts asking whether the threat would seem feasible to a reasonable person. This inquiry would allow a court to incorporate
something like the defendant’s known possession of a firearm (as in Knox)
into the analysis, because such a fact would make the threat seem more feasible
to a reasonable person. Likewise, the commonly recurring factor of listeners’
reactions could be used as evidence to show whether reasonable people understood the threat to be feasible. For instance, the fact that Watts’s listeners

223. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969).
224. Putting aside the fact that the statute used to charge Watts criminalized only threats
to the president.
225. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
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laughed might serve as evidence of their understanding that, even if he were
drafted, he was extremely unlikely to get President Johnson “in [his] sights.” 226
Third, Ollman looked to “literary context.” This step essentially requires
looking beyond the few words that are allegedly threatening (or, in the Ollman
situation, allegedly defamatory) to everything else the defendant said. Again,
the importance of taking this step in an analysis of the context surrounding a
threat is fairly obvious. Indeed, interpreting speech based on the words
around it is the plainest meaning of the Supreme Court’s instruction to interpret threats in context. Many courts already employ some form of inquiry into
other statements by the defendant. For example, the Watts factor of whether
speech is “conditional” would come in under this step. The court in Knox likewise applied something like this step when it emphasized the overall violence
of the words surrounding the actual threats in the rap, and held that this language supported classifying the threat as “true.” 227 That said, the court also
could have looked at the generalized nature of the rap’s other lyrics as evidence
that Knox’s statements expressed anger about the police as a group, not threats
to harm two individual officers.
Fourth, Ollman considered social context, which is of paramount importance for identifying true threats. This step most squarely incorporates the
key consideration of a statement’s location in the “political arena” noted by
the Supreme Court in Watts. 228 Political speech traditionally receives maximal
First Amendment protection, 229 so it is especially crucial that courts consider
any link between the alleged threat and politics. In Knox, the majority dismissed out of hand any possibility that the rap’s antipathy toward police might
be related to political issues, 230 despite the fact that rappers often imbue their
songs with political meaning. 231 A more extensive discussion of the political
context may not have altered the result in Knox, 232 but it still would have been
valuable to ensuring the maintenance of Knox’s speech rights.

226. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706–07.
227. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1158 (Pa. 2018).
228. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
229. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”).
230. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1158.
231. Cf. Kerr, supra note 164, at 195 (“Rap, much like your typical political speech, functions as a First Amendment ‘safety valve,’ allowing rappers to vent anti-authority aggression and
to lament systemic racism and police brutality. We can hear rap, even rap made of violent, inchoate lyrics, about ‘the system’ and law enforcement to be a covered form of political speech.
For example, NWA and Ice-T have been valorized by the Art World. But even if they had selfpublished their anti-police raps their message could be conceptualized as political speech. In
short, without the historical context, a judge might not be able to identify or understand a rap’s
subtextual political message.” (footnote omitted)).
232. Indeed, Justice Wecht directly addressed the possible link between the rap and political issues such as police brutality, yet he still voted to uphold the conviction. Knox, 190 A.3d at
1167 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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This fourth step should also account for “social” features of the speech,
such as the medium of communication, the relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim, and its artistic value. The medium of communication will be especially salient in the modern world of social media, where the
particular forum in which a threat is posted may have major repercussions on
how threatening it really is. In Knox, for instance, the court would have needed
to grapple more extensively with the characteristics of YouTube and Facebook
that made it less likely that Knox recorded the rap intending for the police
officers to see it.
Analysis of the social relationship between Knox and the threatened officers would also come in under this step. It is true that Knox had prior interactions with the officers, but the court said little about the nature of those
interactions other than that the officers believed that Knox had a firearm with
him during his first arrest. 233 The history of police brutality against the Black
community in Pittsburgh would also have been relevant to the analysis of social context, 234 painting a fuller picture of what may have motivated Knox to
speak so violently against police other than an intent to induce fear.
This fourth step would also have given the Knox court an explicit mandate
to directly address arguments raised by amici about the social context of rap
as an artistic genre and Knox’s place within it. 235 The court in Knox made
some effort to do this, 236 but it did not give any real credence to the idea that
it might take some extra work to distinguish true threats from protected
speech when the speech is disseminated in a rap song. The court’s conclusion
that couching threats in rap or musical lyrics cannot immunize them from
prosecution does not, on its own, negate the relevance of the fact that Knox
expressed himself through an artistic medium.
In sum, remaking the Ollman test to apply to true threats provides an administrable four-part test for appellate courts conducting an independent review of the record—including all relevant context—to determine whether a
given statement constitutes a “true threat.” Put simply, this Note contends that
appellate courts asked to identify true threats should examine four criteria: (1)
the specificity of the threat, based on the actual words used; (2) the facial feasibility of the threat; (3) the “literary context,” or the language surrounding
the alleged threat; and (4) the broader social context in which the threat was
made, including the medium through which it was communicated and any
political connotations it may have had.

233. Id. at 1160 (majority opinion).
234. See Jody DiPerna & Elaine Frantz, Historical Context: Violence Occurring Against
Black Pittsburghers Today Has Been Happening for More Than a Century-and-a-Half, PITT.
CURRENT (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.pittsburghcurrent.com/historical-context-violence-occurring-against-black-pittsburghers-today-has-been-happening-for-more-than-a-centuryand-a-half [perma.cc/5GPW-7SXT].
235. Cf. Kerr, supra note 164, at 194–99 (discussing rap, and Knox’s rap in particular, as art).
236. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160.
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Even applying this test, and assuming resolution of the threshold questions of intent and standard of review, true threat cases will never become categorically “easy,” nor will application of the test necessarily lead to a different
outcome in close cases. But the fact that the job is difficult does not mean
courts should not do it rigorously; to the contrary, they must take extra care
to prevent threat prosecutions from making an end-run around the First
Amendment. The test would standardize courts’ approaches to analyzing context that may dictate the constitutionality of a true threat conviction, giving
judges and speakers alike crucial guidance about what makes some speech
punishable and other speech protected.
CONCLUSION
Though the First Amendment does not categorically forbid the government from criminalizing threats, it does call for tight limits on the reach of
such laws, which by their very nature punish “pure speech.” Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has been vague about what those limits are. To date, the
major battleground of true threat jurisprudence has been whether a subjective- or objective-intent standard is proper, but the doctrine’s problems are
not fully resolved once a lower court picks a side in that fight. As Knox illustrated, neither test will adequately protect speech unless appellate courts carefully and independently analyze the contextual factors that indicate whether
the defendant’s speech fits into the unprotected “true threat” category.
To safeguard free speech rights while still sanctioning dangerously threatening speech, the Supreme Court should endorse a four-part, Ollman-like
framework. Such a framework would give much-needed guidance to lower
courts on how to interpret the context that is vital to separating true threats
from protected speech. As is, the slapdash state of the true threat doctrine belies America’s “profound national commitment” to free speech.

